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In an analysis of the formation of unions within a single …rm, this
paper addresses conditions under which encompassing unions form.
It is shown that a production function satisfying decreasing marginal
productivity leads to the formation of encompassing unions. This
result holds for di¤erent ways of dividing the surplus within the union.
The e¤ects of changes in heterogeneity, e.g. increased demand for
skilled labor, are also analyzed. In the most reasonable setup, a change
in heterogeneity does not a¤ect the decision whether to form a union
or not. This contrasts with the result in Jun (1989).
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11 Introduction
Unions are an important labor market institution in many countries, more
so in Western Europe than in the United States. Even though the share of
organized labor ranges from around 90% in Scandinavia to little more than
10% in the US, there seem to be few models that address the questions why
and when unions form. Moreover, labor markets are undergoing constant
and rapid change. As pointed out by Nickell and Bell (1995), the demand
for skilled relative to unskilled labor has increased. At least in some sec-
tors of the labor market, heterogeneity among workers also seems to have
increased. This in turn can a¤ect unions. Hirsch (1982), for example, found
empirical evidence that heterogeneity of the labor force a¤ects union mem-
bership. Legislation is also changing to make the labor market more ‡exible.
Legislative amendments are likely to a¤ect the formation and organization
of unions. In an empirical study, Freeman and Pelletier (1990) found that
legislation favorable to unions tends to increase union density.
The main objective of this paper is to analyze the circumstances under
which identical workers form an encompassing union. In earlier models, Horn
and Wolinsky (1988) and Jun (1989) studied union formation when there are
two (groups of) workers. Here we allow for an arbitrary number of workers.
We also examine how changes in the relative demand between skill groups,
heterogeneity and legislation a¤ect the pattern of unionization.
In the model developed here, the agents consist of a set of workers and a
…rm. Workers can form unions and bargain either jointly or separately with
the …rm. The timing is as follows (in two steps): …rst unions form and then
they bargain with the …rm. Union formation can be modeled in di¤erent
2ways. Here, the main model relies on the exclusive membership setup in
Shin and Yi (1991). In this setup, a worker cannot join a union without the
consent of all members of the union. In an extension of the model we also
study the case of open membership. In the second step, the unions’ payo¤s
are given by the bargaining game in Westermark (1998).
We study conditions on the production function that lead workers of
the same type to form an encompassing union. As an example, consider a
production function that satis…es decreasing marginal productivity. Then,
in any coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, all workers join the same union.
The intuition is that if, say, two workers contemplate standing together, the
increase in production due to the two workers is more than twice as large
as the marginal contribution of each of the workers. This implies that the
wage is higher when bargaining together, since workers and the …rm split the
surplus equally. There are also some other production functions that lead to
the formation of an encompassing union.
The e¤ects of changes in both relative demand for skilled/unskilled work-
ers and heterogeneity depend on how the wage structure within unions is
determined. We study a model where the workers bargain noncooperatively
over the wage di¤erential. We consider two cases where the outside option
di¤er. In the …rst case, workers are unemployed if they do not agree on
the wage di¤erential. In the second they are employed and gets the stand
alone wage. The second setup seems to be the most reasonable. In the …rst
case, an increase in demand for skilled labor or in heterogeneity leads to a
breakup of unions in some …rms. The most productive worker can get more
by bargaining alone. In the other case changes in heterogeneity or demand
3for skilled labor do not a¤ect the formation of unions. Also, if the game
in the …rst setup is played repeatedly, changes in demand for skilled labor
or in heterogeneity do not lead to the breakup of unions. Thus, the main
conclusion is that changes in heterogeneity do not a¤ect the formation of
unions.
The theoretical model builds primarily on three earlier studies by Horn
and Wolinsky (1988), who analyzed bargaining between a …rm and two work-
ers, Gül (1989), who examined noncooperative foundations for the Shapley
value, and Shin and Yi (1991), whose exclusive membership game serves as
a basis for our union-formation game. This paper di¤ers from the paper by
Horn and Wolinsky in that we allow for an arbitrary number of workers. A
further di¤erence is that the model can be used to analyze the consequences
of heterogeneity.
The model is developed in Section 2. Existence of equilibrium and con-
ditions that make similar workers join together in an encompassing union
are examined. Some extensions of the model are introduced in Section 3.
Heterogeneity is analyzed in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The set of agentsconsists of a set of workers, denoted W, with generic element
i, and a …rm, denoted CF. Let W be the set of subsets of W, including the
empty set.
Production opportunities are given by the production function f : W !
<: Let ¹ ui represent the utility for worker i when not working, measured in
4units of production. The production function and utilities when not working
satisfy the following condition.
De…nition 1 The production function f and (¹ ui)i2W satisfy restricted strict
superadditivity if




The economic interpretation of this condition is the following. Suppose
the …rm employs the workers in C. Then, adding the set D to the …rm leads
to an increase in output larger than the sum of the losses of utility for the
workers in D.
2.1 The Union Formation Game
Aunion structure is a partition of the set of workers. Each set in the partition
is called a union. We use this convention to simplify notation, although it im-
plies that workers bargaining separately are also called unions. Let n denote
the number of sets in the partition. In the union formation game, each worker
simultaneously announces a set of workers with whom he would like to form
a union. Formally, the strategy space for worker i is Si = fT µ W j i 2 Tg,
with generic element si. The strategy space is then S = £i2WSi, with generic
element s. Let s¡i denote (s1;::;si¡1;si+1;::;sjWj). Also, let sT = (si)i2T and
s¡T = (si)i2WnT. The outcome, given a strategy pro…le s, is a partition of the
set of workers, denoted C(s) = fC1;:::;Cng. Let ui(s) denote the payo¤ for
5worker i, given the strategy pro…le s. The payo¤s are given by the bargaining
game described below.
A union cannot form unless all its’ members agree on who should be
accepted. Formally, a set C is in C(s) if for all i;j 2 C we have sj = si ¶ C
and for all k 2 WnC and all i 2 C we have sk 6= si. A worker can unilaterally
leave a union, but he cannot break it up completely, as illustrated by the
following example. Suppose that there are three workers and that si =
f1;2;3g for all i 2 W. The outcome is C(s) = ff1;2;3gg. Now, if 1 deviates
and announces s0
1 = f1g, the outcome is C(s0
1;s2;s3) = ff1g;f2;3gg.
The equilibrium concepts we use when studying the union formation game
are Nash equilibrium and coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE).
De…nition 2 A strategy pro…le s is a Nash equilibrium if
for all i and all s
0
i 2 Si, ui(s) ¸ ui(s
0
i;s¡i):
To de…ne a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium we need to introduce the
following concept.
De…nition 3 An internally consistent improvement for T µ W on s is de-
…ned by induction.
If jTj = 1, i.e. T = fig for some i 2 W, then s0
i is an internally
consistent improvement for i on s if it is an improvement on s; that is,
ui(s0
i;s¡i) > ui(s).
6If jTj > 1, then s0
T is an internally consistent improvement for T on s if
i) ui(s0
T;s¡T) > ui(s) for all i 2 T;
ii)
there is no K ½ T (K 6= ?) for which there is an
internally consistent improvement on (s0
T;s¡T):
De…nition 4 A strategy pro…le s is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium if
there is no T µ W that has an internally consistent improvement on s:
The CPNE concept allows for a situation where several agents deviate
simultaneously, although with some restrictions. When considering union
formation, it seems reasonable to allow formultilateral deviations by workers,
since it is probably not di¢cult for subgroups of workers to meet and discuss
forming a union.
2.2 The Bargaining Game
In the bargaining game, the players consist of all the unions that formed in
the union formation game and the …rm. The …rm is denoted CF. In this
section, we denote C(s) by C. With some abuse of notation, the player set is
then fCF;C1;:::;Cng. Let U denote the set of possible union structures
We assume that the payo¤s for any union Ci 2 C is given by the payo¤s
in the non-cooperative bargaining game in Westermark (1998), where unions




Also, recall that c denotes the bargaining cost incurred on the players. The
cost is split equally between the participants in the bargaining.
7For all C 2 U, let UCi(C) denote the expected utility forplayerCi 2 C[CF.
Recall that n denotes the number of unions. For all C 2 U, the payo¤ for a
union Ci 2 C, is
UCi(C) =







UCF(C) = f(W) ¡
n X
i=1






One problem is how the agreed upon payo¤ for the union should be di-
vided among the union members. The assumption that all members of the
union get the same wage accords with the observation that unions often at-
tempt to equalize wages. It has been pointed out by Blau and Kahn (1996)
that wages have a higher variance for non-union than for union workers. One
explanation for this is that unions are political organizations; see Freeman
and Medo¤ (1984).
To see that political decisions can lead to equalization of wages, consider
the following example. Let µ denote the productivity of a worker and let ¹ µ
denote the mean productivity of the workers in the union. Suppose union
members vote on wage pro…les that compensate them for some of the pro-
ductivity di¤erence, a ¢
¡
µ ¡ ¹ µ
¢
+ ¹ µ, provided that this pro…le is feasible for
all a 2 [0;1]. Then, if the median productivity is lower than the average, the
median voter chooses to vote for a = 0: Thus, given the strategy pro…le s
in the union formation game leading to the coalition structure C, the equal




f(W) ¡ f(WnCi) + ¹ uCi ¡ c
2jCij
8k 2 Ci;
8where Ci 2 C.
An alternative assumption is that union members bargain over the wages.
Let < Z;d > denote a bargaining problem, where d is the disagreement point
and Z is the feasible set. Let ' denote a bargaining solution. Since utility is
transferable, the feasible set for the workers in union Ci is





f(W) ¡ f(WnCi) + ¹ uCi ¡ c
2
g:
Let dCi 2 <jCij denote the disagreement point for the workers in union Ci.
Let ' denote a bargaining solution. Given that the payo¤s are distributed




Also, the stand alone wage is denoted wk(k).
2.3 Equilibrium
Now consider union formation again and assume that payo¤s are given by
expressions 2 and 3. It is easily seen that a Nash equilibrium exists. Consider
the following strategy pro…le. Let all workers announce si = i. Then C(s) =
ff1g;f2g;:::;fngg: Consider any s0 such that s0
i 6= i for some i and s0
j = j for
all j 6= i. Then C(s) = C(s0) and thus no worker can gain from a unilateral
deviation; see Lemma 8.1 in Shin and Yi (1991). The reason is that, given
the strategy pro…le s, a unilateral deviation cannot change the outcome. At
least two workers have to deviate in order for the outcome to change.
To study CPNE in the union formation game we need to determine the
payo¤ distribution within unions. No equilibrium need exist as can be seen
by the following example.
9Example 1 Suppose jWj = 3 and f(W) = 4, f(S) = 3 whenever jSj = 2
and f(S) = 1 whenever jSj = 1. Furthermore, for all i 2 W, we assume
¹ ui = 0. Then, ignoring c, the surplus for a union if all workers form a union
is 2, if two workers form a union
3
2. Let ^ ' denote the solution that gives rise
to the wages described below. The stand alone wage is 1
2 for all workers. Let
w
^ '
i (W) = 2
3 for all i 2 W, w
^ '
1(12) = 0:8 and w
^ '





3(23) = 0:7, w
^ '
1(13) = 0:79 and w
^ '
3(13) = 0:71. Then no CPNE exists.
Too see this, …rst consider a strategy pro…le s that leads to an encompass-
ing union. Then let 1 and 2 deviate and announce s0
1 = s0


















2(2) none of the deviating workers has an incentive to deviate




2 = f12g is an internally consistent
improvement.
Now consider a strategy pro…le s that gives rise to the coalition structure
ff12gf3gg. Let worker 2 and 3 deviate by choosing s0
2 = s0









3(3). The deviation s0
2;s0
3 is an internally











3(3). By a similar argument, no pro…le where 2 workers form a union can
be an equilibrium.
Lastly, consider a strategy pro…le s that such that all workers stand sep-
arately. Then let 1 and 2 deviate and announce s0
1 = s0


















2(2) none of the deviating workers has an incentive to deviate
from the pro…le (s0
1;s0
2;s3). We conclude that no CPNE exists.
Given some sharing rule ', de…ne for all S µ W, ¢
'
i (S;d) = w
'
i (S) ¡ di
10for all i 2 S. Say that ' satis…es the proportional property if
for all i;j 2 W, for all S µ W, if i;j 2 S then ¢
'
i (S;d) = kij ¢
'
j (S;d):
Thus worker j always gets, for example, three times as much of the surplus
as worker i if they are in the same union. Under our assumptions, the Nash
bargaining solution satis…es the proportional property for kij = 1 for all
i;j 2 W. The weighted Nash bargaining solution can also be accommodated
by other choices of kij.
Theorem 1 A CPNE exists in the union formation game if ' satis…es the
proportional property.


















i (W;d). Then ¹ ¢
'
i (W;d) = ¹ ¢
'


















































Step 2: Construction of strategy pro…le smax.
Let ¹ ¢'(S;d) = ¹ ¢
'
i (S;d) for all i 2 S. Find argmaxSµWf¹ ¢'(S;d)g.
If there is more than one such set, pick one of the largest, Smax1. For all
k 2 Smax1, let sk = Smax1.
Now …nd argmaxSµWnSmax1f¹ ¢'(S;d)g. If there is more than one such
set, pick one of the largest, Smax2. For all k 2 Smax2, let sk = Smax2.
Repeat this until [m
j=1Smaxj = W. Denote this strategy pro…le by smax.
11Step 3: Equilibrium.
We claim that smax constitutes a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. No set
of workers in Smax1 has an internally consistent improvement on smax, since
they already get the highest possible payo¤. This follows since, for i 2 S;T,
¢
'
i (S;d) > ¢
'
i (T;d) i¤ ¹ ¢
'(S;d) > ¹ ¢
'(T;d):
Hence, if a set of workers has an internally consistent improvement on smax
it must consist of workers in WnSmax1.
However, no set of workers in Smax2 has an internally consistent improve-
ment on smax together with some other set of workers in WnSmax1, since they
already get the highest possible wage in WnSmax1. Hence, if a set of workers
has an internally consistent improvement on smax it must consist of workers
in WnfSmax1 [ Smax2g.
By repeating this argument for all Smaxj no set of workers has an in-
ternally consistent improvement on the strategy pro…le smax. Thus, smax
constitutes a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium.
The intuition behind the proof is as follows. First, normalize all wages
according to the wage of, say, worker 1. Proportionality implies that if the
(net) nonnormalized wage is higher for a worker in one union than in another,
then the (net) normalized wage is also higher. Next, …nd the coalition that
gives the highest normalized wage. The workers in this coalition form a
union. By proportionality, all workersin thiscoalition getthe highest possible
wage. Then, among the remaining workers, …nd the coalition that gives the
highest wage. This coalition forms a union. Repeat this until all workers are
members of unions. The resulting union structure is an equilibrium. This
12follows, since a deviating coalition cannot consist of workers in the union
where the workers get the highest wage. Among the remaining workers, no
worker in the coalition that gets the next highest wage wants to deviate.
Then a deviating coalition cannot consist of workers in this coalition either.
By repeating this argument for all unions, we have an equilibrium.
The Shapley Value
Now assume that the surplus in a union is distributed according to the Shap-
ley value. The surplus that accrues to a union is the bene…ts from bargaining
with the …rm. Thus, the value of a coalition Ci is then
v(Ci) =
f(W) ¡ f(WnCi) + ¹ uCi ¡ c
2
: (4)
Note that if jCij = 1, v(Ci) is equal to the stand alone wage for the worker





























+ ¹ uk: (5)
Thus, each worker gets a weighted average of his marginal contributions when
joining a union S ½ Ci. For example, suppose an encompassing union forms.
















13Note that this coincides with the solution presented in Stole and Zweibel
(1996) when workers bargain separately and sign non-binding contracts.
Existence of a CPNE equilibrium cannot be guaranteed. The following
production function and reservation utilitiesisan example that hasnoCPNE.
Assume that jWj = 4 and that f(W) = 41, f(123) = 35 , f(124) = 40,
f(134) = 32, f(234) = 40, f(12) = 20, f(13) = 30, f(14) = 20, f(23) = 25,
f(24) = 20, f(34) = 20, f(1) = 10, f(2) = 19, f(3) = 0 and f(4) = 19. Also,
assume that ¹ u1 = ¹ u2 = ¹ u3 = ¹ u4 = 0.
2.4 Encompassing Unions
Now suppose all workers are identical and that the payo¤s are distributed
equally among union members. Any symmetric and weakly Pareto optimal
solution gives rise to this distribution of payo¤s within the union. We assume







then there exists a Nash equilibrium in the union formation game where all
workers are members of the same union.
Condition 6 implies that the wage when everyone standstogether is higher
than when a worker stands alone. Since the only deviation a worker can make
when an encompassing union has formed is to stand alone the union structure
with an encompassing union is a Nash equilibrium. The bargaining cost also
makes an encompassing union more attractive. Alone, a worker has to pay
c
2 himself. If he is a member of an encompassing union, the cost c
2 is split up
equally among union members.
14Suppose the following condition holds







This condition implies that the wage is highest when all workers bargain
together. Condition 7 is implied by decreasing marginal productivity. Then
any CPNE union structure consists of an encompassing union, as is shown
below.
Theorem 2 If ' is symmetric, e¢cient and 7 holds, then a CPNE union
structure consists of an encompassing union.

























Clearly, for all C ½ W, expression 7 implies that, for all i 2 C, wed
i (W) >
wed
i (C). Then the strategy pro…le s¤ where, for all i 2 W, s¤
i = W is a
CPNE. Since wages are smaller in any union C ½ W, there is no C that has
an internally consistent improvement on s¤.
Now consider a strategy pro…le s0 such that there exists a union C 2 C(s)
with C ½ W. Let all workers deviate by playing s00
i = W. Since for all
C ½ W and all i 2 C we have wed
i (W) > wed
i (C), all workers gain. Also, by
7, there is no pro…table deviation from s00 for any set of workers. Thus s00 is
an internally consistent improvement of W on s0. Hence, a strategy pro…le s
15such that there exists a C 2 C(s) with C ½ W cannot be a CPNE
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Since the wage is highest
for the encompassing union and since multilateral deviations are allowed, in
any structure which has more than one union, all workers deviate together
and form an encompassing union. Given that an encompassing union has
formed, no set of workers wants to deviate, since that would reduce their
wages.
Recall that all unions are selected with the same probability. Other se-
lection probabilities are also reasonable. For example, the probability that
a union is selected to bargain with the …rm could depend on the number of
workers in the union. Let p
p
Ci denote the probability that union Ci is selected
as proposer, and assume c small. The payo¤ for a union Ci is
p
p
Ci [f(W) ¡ f(WnCi) ¡ ¹ uCi] + ¹ uCi ¡ p
p
Cic:
Assume that payo¤sin the union formation game are given by thisequilib-
rium. Then, as long as the probability that the union is selected as proposer
is the same for all unions, the condition is the same as condition 7. If the
probability that a union is selected as proposer varies among unions, then
the condition corresponding to 7 is










[f(W) ¡ f(WnC) ¡ ¹ uC]:
The Shapley Value
Now suppose workers are paid wages according to the Shapley value as in
section 2.3 and relax the assumption of identical workers. The payo¤ for a
16worker is given by expression 5. Suppose that the production function satisfy
decreasing marginal productivity. We have the following result.
Lemma 1 If ' = Sh and f satis…es decreasing marginal productivity, then
an encompassing union forms.
Proof. Decreasing marginal productivity implies that, for all S;T ½ W such
that S ¾ T and all k = 2 T we have
f(WnS) ¡ f(WnfS [ kg)
2
>
f(WnT) ¡ f(WnfT [ kg)
2
:















+ ¹ uk: (8)
Consider adding a worker j to some union Ci ½ W. Let C0
i = Ci [ j.
Let S ½ Ci and k 2 Ci be arbitrary. Consider union Ci. The probability




jCij! and the contribution is
f(WnS)¡f(WnfS[kg)
2 .
Consider the union C0













jSj!(jCij ¡ jSj ¡ 1)!
jCij!
and the contribution is
f(WnS)¡f(WnfS[kg)














jSj!(jCij ¡ jSj ¡ 1)!
jCij!
and the contribution is
f(WnfS[jg)¡f(WnfS[k[jg)

















































By decreasing marginal productivity we have
f(WnfS [ jg) ¡ f(WnfS [ k [ jg)
2
>
f(WnS) ¡ f(WnfS [ kg)
2
:




By induction, for all Di and Ci such that jDij > jCij and all k 2 Ci, we have
wSh
k (Di) > wSh
k (Ci). By an argument similar to the proof of Theorem 1 an
encompassing union is the only CPNE union structure.
Thus, if a worker is added to a union, expression 5 implies that the payo¤
for all the workers in the union increases. Then, encompassing unions is a
CPNE when the production function satisfy decreasing marginal productiv-
ity. Also, it is the unique CPNE, since any other union structure has the
workers deviating and forming an encompassing union.
3 Extensions
3.1 Open Membership
We now turn to the case where workers are allowed to join a union without
the consent of its members. This seems to be most reasonable when the
workers are identical. The union formation game is modi…ed as follows. The
18strategy space for worker i is Si = fa1;a2;:::;arg where r ¸ jWj. A coalition
C forms if, for all i;j 2 C, we have si = sj and, for all k = 2 C and all i 2 C,
we have sk 6= si. Then a worker can unilaterally join a union, as can be
seen by the following example. Suppose there are …ve workers. Assume that
s1 = s2 = s3 = a2, s4 = a4 and s5 = a1. Then C(s) = ff1;2;3g;f4g;f5gg.
Now suppose worker 5 announces s0
5 = a2 instead. Then C(s1;s2;s3;s4;s0
5) =
ff1;2;3;5g;f4gg.
In this setup, no coalition-proof Nash equilibrium need exist, as can be
seen from the next example with identical workers.
Example 2 If the workers are identical, wages in a union depend only on
the size of the union. Let ^ w(i) denote the wage in a union of size i. Now
suppose that jWj = 5 and that ^ w(3) > ^ w(4) > ^ w(2) > ^ w(1) > ^ w(5). First,
suppose that a strategy pro…le s has a union structure where no union consists




3 = ai where ai 6= s4 and ai 6= s5. By construction, the deviating




3;s4;s5), since they get the highest possible wage. Thus, workers
1;2 and 3 have an internally consistent improvement on s. Second, suppose
that a strategy pro…le s has a union structure with a union that consists
of exactly three workers, say workers 1, 2 and 3. Then worker 4 gains by
deviating and announcing s0
4 = s1, since ^ w(4) > ^ w(2) > ^ w(1). Thus, worker
4 has an internally consistent improvement on s. This implies that no CPNE
union structure exists.
Next, consider conditions on the production function for the formation of
an encompassing union. Consider the following condition. The condition for
19an encompassing union to be the only Nash equilibrium coalition structure
is
8C








This condition implies that the wage increases with the size of the union,
taking the bargaining cost into account. It implies condition 7, which follows
by setting C = W.
Lemma 2 If ' is symmetric, e¢cient and 9 hold, then a NE union structure
consists of an encompassing union.













By condition 9 above, we have wed
i (C) > wed
i (D) whenever jCj > jDj, for all
i 2 D.
First, consider a union structure with more than one union. Let C0 2 C(s)
denote one of the largest unions. Then, for all i;j 2 C0, si = sj. Consider
some k 2 WnC0. Suppose k 2 D0 2 C(s). For all i 2 C0; let s0
k = si. Since
jC0j ¸ jD0j, we have wed
k (C0 [ k) > wed
k (D0). Thus, no strategy pro…le where
there are more than one union can be a NE union structure.
Second, suppose W 2 C(s). Then, since wed
i (W) > wed
i (i) no worker gains
by deviating from s.
Consider a union structure with more than one union. Find the largest
possible union. Then the workers in that union have the highest wage, com-
pared with the wage in the other unions. Moreover, if another worker joins
20the union, the wage increases. Since it is possible for a worker to join a union
unilaterally in the open membership setup, he will choose to do so. Hence
any initial structure with more than one union cannot be an equilibrium.
The union structure where all workers form an encompassing union is a NE,
since the wage is lower in all other possible unions.
The condition on the production function for an encompassingunion to be
a CPNE union structure is the same as in the case of exclusive membership.
3.2 Endogenous Labor Choice
In this section, we make the additional assumption that the …rm can choose
the level of employment after unions have formed. Thus, we have a game with
two time periods. We restrict attention to identical workers and assume that
payo¤s within a union is distributed according to a symmetric and weakly
Pareto optimal solution. Thus, if workers are identical, all workers that are
members of the same union receive equal wages.
The player set is W[CF. In the …rst period, each worker i simultaneously
announces a set of workers it wants to form a union with. Formally, the
actions available to worker i in period 1 is A1i = fT µ W j i 2 Tg, with
generic element a1i. Let A1 = £i2WA1i and let a1 = (a1i)i2W. For each
a1 2 A1 there exist a union structure, denoted C(a1), de…ned by the exclusive
membership mechanism, as described in Section 2. Now consider the actions
available to the …rm, given a1 2 A1. For all a1 2 A1, we assume that the
actions available to the …rmis A2(a1) = fT ½ C(a1)[?g with generic element
a2. Thus, the …rm is allowed to choose a subset of C(a1) and then it hires all
workers in the selected unions. Hiring none of the workers is allowed. Let
21§ denote the strategy space of this game, with generic element ¾. Let Ht
denote the set of possible histories at time t. Note that, H0 = ?. A strategy
in period t is a function of all possible histories up to period t. Given ¾, let
U(¾) = fi 2 ¾2(a1) where a1 = ¾1(?)g denote the set of workers the …rm








uCF(¾) = f(U(¾)) ¡
X
Ci2¾2(a1)n?
f(U(¾)) ¡ f(U(¾)nCi) + ¹ uCi ¡ c
2
:
Any worker j 2 W that is not hired by the …rm gets ¹ uj. Let ¡ denote this
extensive game.
Say that a strategy pro…le ¾ 2 § is a Perfectly CPNE in the game ¡ if
it is a CPNE in any proper subgame of ¡. This does not coincide with the
concept used in Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston (1987). However, using their
concept does not a¤ect our result.
Given some ¾ 2 §, since the …rm is the only player in the last period, a
strategy pro…le ¾ 2 § that is a Perfectly CPNE requires that the …rm must
choose to bargain with the subset of unions that gives the …rm the highest
pro…ts. Also, there cannot be an ICI where the …rm deviates together with
some workers to a pro…le where the …rm’s pro…ts are not maximal, given the
resulting union structure. Then the …rm can deviate further and choose to
hire the unions that gives the …rm highest pro…t.
A motivation for letting the …rm choose employment after unions have
formed is that the choice of union structure is a more long-run decision than
22the …rm’s choice of employment. We examine some of the consequences
of introducing a labor choice into the model by studying a three-worker
example, related to the analysis in Horn and Wolinsky (1988).
Example 3 Consider an example with three identical workers. Let ' be any
symmetric and weakly Pareto optimal solution. We assume ¹ ui = 0 for i = 1;2
and 3. Let the production function be de…ned as follows
f(S) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
4 for jSj = 3
2" for jSj = 2
" for jSj = 1
where 0 < " < 2. Thus, all workers produce four units, two workers produce
2" units and one worker produces " units. This implies that the workers are
nearly perfect complements if " is small.
Consider the payo¤s. Suppose all workers are hired and the workers form
separate unions. The wages are then wi(i) = 2¡"¡ c
2 for all i = 1;2;3. Now
suppose two of the workers, say 1 and 2, join together in a union, and all








4. If all workers
form an encompassing union wages are w
'
i (123) = 2
3 ¡ c
6 for i = 1;2;3. If
two workers are hired, the wages for the hired workers are "
2 ¡ c





4 if the hired workers formed a union. Pro…t is " ¡
c
2 if the
hired workers formed a union and "¡c otherwise. If one worker is hired, the
wage is "
2 ¡ c





4. First, suppose " =
1
4. The pro…ts of the …rm for di¤erent
hiring levels and union structure is given by the following table.
23Table 1. Pro…ts when " =
1
4.
Union structure 1 hired 2 hired 3 hired





















Consider a strategy pro…le ¾ leading to a union structure where all work-
ers bargain by themselves. Then the …rm hires two workers and wages for




2. Consider the deviation where two workers j;k
announce ¾0
1j(?) = ¾0
1k(?), leading to j and k forming a union. Then
the …rm hires all workers. Note that both workers that deviate gains, since
w
'










2. Also, since w
'
i (123) < w
'
i (jk), none
of the workers j;k has a further deviation. Thus, this deviation is an ICI
upon ¾. Consider a strategy pro…le ¾ leading to a union structure where all
workers bargain together. Then the …rm hires all workers. A deviation by two
workers to form a separate union is again an ICI upon ¾, since, for i 2 W,
w
'
i (123) < w
'
i (jk). Also, a strategy pro…le that leads to a union structure
where two workers form a union is a Perfectly CPNE, since any deviation
from this pro…le leads to lower wages.
Now suppose " =
5
4. The pro…ts of the …rm for di¤erent hiring levels and
union structures when " = 5
4 is given by the following table.
24Table 2. Pro…ts when " =
5
4.
Union structure 1 hired 2 hired 3 hired





















The …rm always hire three workers. Then w
'
j (W) = 2
3 ¡ c
6 and for all











for j 2 S. Consider any strategy pro…le ¾ where a union consisting of more
than one worker has formed. Consider the deviation where the worker j is
in this union. Let ¾0
1j(?) = fjg. Since wj(j) > w
'
j (S) for any S such that
jSj > 1, this deviation is an ICI upon ¾. Also, since wk(k) > w
'
k(S) for all
k 2 W for any S such that jSj > 1, any strategy pro…le where the workers
bargain separately is a Perfectly CPNE.
The reason underlying the result when " =
1
4 is that workers have very
strong bargaining power when negotiating by themselves. They can more or
less shut down production by going on strike. The …rm would then incur
losses; hence the …rm chooses to hire less than three workers. All players get
low payo¤s. By joining together, two workers could reduce their bargaining
power. Increasing employment from two to three workers makes it possi-
ble to utilize the increasing returns of the production function. Everyone
would gain, compared with the situation where workers bargain separately.
When " =
5
4, this problem does not occur. Thus, the only equilibrium union
structure is where each worker stands alone.
25As shown by Horn and Wolinsky, if two workers are close complements,
they do not form an encompassing union. The reason is that under strong
complementarity, when an individual worker withholds his labor, the …rm
loses a lot of output. Hence he can negotiate a high wage. On the other
hand, when the workers are substitutes, output is less a¤ected if one worker
withholds his labor; hence this worker gets a low wage if he bargains by
himself. In other words, when workers are substitutes, joining together is
pro…table for the workers. Horn and Wolinsky also claimed (without proof)
that the results extend to the case with more than two workers. Contrary to





4) leads to formation of a union.
4 Demand Shifts and Changes in Heterogene-
ity
To study changes in relative demand and heterogeneity, we consider a model
with two types of workers, 1 and 2.
Let the production function be de…ned as
2 works 2 does not work
1 works ¹(1 + µ) µ
1 does not work 1 0
where ¹ represents the degree of complementarity between the two workers,
26and µ ¸ 1 the productivity di¤erence.1 Thus, worker 1 is the most productive
worker. We assume 0 < ¹ u2 · ¹ u1. An increase in demand for skilled workers
or an increase in heterogeneity is modeled as an increase in µ:
In the paper by Jun (1989), who studies if two workers form a union
or not, equal sharing is obtained when a union is formed. In the paper,
workers …rst decide whether to form a union and then bargain over the wage
di¤erential before production starts. The reason equal sharing is obtained
in Jun’s paper does not seem very sensible, however. In Jun’s model, in
the case where wages are unequal in a union, workers bargain over the wage
di¤erential. When bargaining, the outside option of the high productivity
worker is binding. Then bargaining gives him the outside option (the stand
alone wage). At an earlier stage, the high productivity worker can choose
to stand by himself (and get production started immediately). Because the
worker is impatient he does so, since he gets the same wage earlier. Thus no
union forms.
To study this, we study a game where a union …rst is formed. If a union
is formed then noncooperative bargaining over the wage di¤erential takes
place. Thus, …rst the two workers simultaneously announce a coalition of
workers. If both workers do not agree to form a union, they both receive
their stand alone wages. If they agree to form a union, one of the workers
is selected as proposer with equal probability. The selected proposer then
1Horn and Wolinsky (1988) use
U works U does not work
S works y +x x
S does not work x 0
27makes a proposal, denoted bi for i = 1;2, how to divide the surplus within the
union. The respondent then answers yes or no. If the proposal is accepted,
the allocation is implemented. If the proposal is rejected, each worker i gets
a payo¤ di. The …gure below describes the game.





































































































































We analyze two cases where we assume di = ¹ ui and di = wi(i) for i = 1;2.
The motivation for the …rst setup is that production cannot start until the
workers have agreed on how to organize themselves. We study subgame per-
fect equilibria that are also CPNE of this game. The perfectly CPNE concept
28presented in Section 3.2 gives results similar to those presented below. How-
ever, in a repeated game, studied in the next section, problems with existence
arise if the perfectly CPNE concept is used. Recall that a strategy pro…le is a
subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) if it is a Nash equilibrium in any proper
subgame of the game.
The strategy space is denoted §b with generic element ¾. Let
¢(12) =
¹(1 + µ) ¡ ¹ u1 ¡ ¹ u2
2
+ ¹ u1 + ¹ u2
be the (gross) surplus for the union.
We have the following result.
Lemma 3 Suppose di = ¹ ui for i = 1;2. If ¹ < 1¡
1
(1+µ) j(µ ¡ ¹ u1) + (¹ u2 ¡ 1)j
then any ¾ 2 SPE \ CPNE has a union structure consisting of an encom-
passing union.
Proof. Recall that the stand alone wages are
w1(1) =





¹(1 + µ) ¡ µ ¡ ¹ u2
2
+ ¹ u2:
First, consider the proposals made by workers if an encompassing union
forms.
If a worker i is selected as proposer, he o¤ers the other worker his con-
tinuation payo¤. Any such bid is accepted. Thus, b1 = ¢(12) ¡ ¹ u2 and
b2 = ¢(12) ¡ ¹ u1. The payo¤ for worker 1 if he is the proposer is then
¹(1+µ)¡¹ u1¡¹ u2
2 + ¹ u1 and the payo¤ for worker 2 if he is the proposer is then
29¹(1+µ)¡¹ u1¡¹ u2
2 + ¹ u2. Now consider the continuation payo¤ after an encom-
passing union has formed, but before the proposer is selected. The con-
tinuation payo¤ for worker 1 is v1 =
¹(1+µ)¡¹ u1¡¹ u2
4 + ¹ u1 and for worker 2
v2 =
¹(1+µ)¡¹ u1¡¹ u2
4 + ¹ u2.
Now consider the union formation game. Clearly, a strategy pro…le ¾ 2
SPE where an encompassing union forms can only be a CPNE if v1 ¸ w1(1)
and v2 ¸ w2(2). This implies
1 +
(1 ¡ ¹ u2)
(1 + µ)
+





(µ ¡ ¹ u1)
(1 + µ)
+
(¹ u2 ¡ 1)
(1 + µ)
¸ ¹: (11)
Thesesconditions are both satis…ed if ¹ · 1¡ 1
(1+µ) j(µ ¡ ¹ u1) + (¹ u2 ¡ 1)j. If an
encompassing union has formed no worker wants to deviate, since v1 ¸ w1(1)
and v2 ¸ w2(2).
Also, if the inequality is strict and if ¾ do not lead to the formation of
an encompassing union, both workers has an ICI upon ¾. The reason is the
following. Expressions 10 and 11 imply that the following deviation is an
ICI upon ¾. Both workers announce f12g and choose b1 = ¢(12) ¡ ¹ u2 and
b2 = ¢(12)¡¹ u1. These bids are accepted. Then expressions 10 and 11 imply
that both workers gain strictly.
Also, given that a union has formed, suppose bargaining overthe wage dif-
ferential instead is constructed as in a standard Rubinstein bargaining game
(with in…nitely many bargaining rounds). Then workers alternate proposing
and payo¤s are discounted. If workers get the utility of leisure as long as
30no agreement has been reached, a similar result appears when the discount
factor is close to one.
Now suppose µ changes. The e¤ect on the possible values of ¹ that allows
for the formation of an encompassing union is ambiguous, depending on
whether (µ ¡ ¹ u1)+(¹ u2 ¡ 1) is positive or negative. If µ+ ¹ u2 > 1+ ¹ u1 the net








¹ u2 ¡ ¹ u1 ¡ 2
(1 + µ)2 < 0:









2 + ¹ u1 ¡ ¹ u2
(1 + µ)2 > 0:
Note that, if µ + ¹ u2 < 1 + ¹ u1 and 1 ¡
1
(1+µ) j(µ ¡ ¹ u1) + (¹ u2 ¡ 1)j < ¹ < 1,
then the sum of stand alone wages is smaller than ¢(12). Also, it is the low
productive worker that gains by leaving the union and standing by himself.
The most reasonable case is clearly when µ + ¹ u2 > 1 + ¹ u1. This holds
for example when the utility from leisure is proportional to productivity, i.e.
¹ u1 = kµ and ¹ u2 = k such that k < 1. Then, when µ increases, the cuto¤ level
for ¹ decreases. An increase in the demand for skilled labor or heterogeneity
leadsto the breakup in unionsformsome …rms. The high productivity worker
gains by leaving the union and standing by himself.
If an encompassing union forms the expected wages are
¹(1+µ)¡¹ u1¡¹ u2
4 + ¹ u1
and
¹(1+µ)¡¹ u1¡¹ u2
4 + ¹ u2. Then, if ¹ u1 = ¹ u2 we have equal division, as in Jun
(1989).
Now assume di = wi(i) for i = 1;2. We have the following result.
31Corollary 1 Suppose di = wi(i) for i = 1;2. If ¹ < 1 then any ¾ 2
SPE \ CPNE has a union structure consisting of an encompassing union.
Proof. If a worker i is selected as proposer, he o¤ers the other worker
his continuation payo¤. Thus, b1 =
µ¡¹ u1
2 + ¹ u1 and b2 =
1¡¹ u2
2 + ¹ u2. Now
consider the continuation payo¤ after an encompassing union has formed,






2 + ¹ u1
¢





2 + ¹ u2
¢
.




Clearly, both conditions hold if ¹ · 1. If ¹ < 1, by a similar argument as in
3, any ¾ 2 SPE \CPNE has a union structure consisting of an encompass-
ing union.
Thus, in this setup, changes in heterogeneity does not a¤ect the formation
of an encompassing union.
4.1 Repeated game
The second setup in the previous section seems to be the most reasonable.
Furthermore, if we consider the …rst setup and assume that the union for-
mation game is played repeatedly, an encompassing union can be formed.
Let ± denote the common discount factor for the workers. Note that a
worker can guarantee himself the stand alone wage in the game described
32above. Also, note that, if ¹ < 1 then w1(1) + w2(2) < ¢(12). Thus, the
sum of stand alone wages is smaller than the sum of the wages when an
encompassing union forms. Then, using a folk theorem (Osborne and Rubin-
stein (1995)), a pro…le where an encompassing union forms in all periods and
where the discounted payo¤ for each worker i is strictly larger than 1
1¡±wi(i)
is a subgame perfect equilibrium, for a su¢ciently large ±. To see this, con-
sider any ®1 > w1(1) and ®2 > w2(2) such that ®1 + ®2 = ¢(12). Consider
a strategy pro…le constructed as follows. Both workers start by announcing
f12g and proposing b1 = ®1 and b2 = ®2 when each worker is selected as
proposer. These bids are accepted. As long as there is no deviation from
this pro…le, the workers continue using announcing f12g, proposing b1 = ®1
and b2 = ®2 and accepting these proposals. If there is a deviation by worker
2 then worker 1 punishes worker 2 by announcing f1g in T time periods and
thus forcing worker 2 to his minmax payo¤. After the T periods of punish-
ments, worker 1 and 2 announces f12g, proposing b0
1 > ®1 and b0
2 < ®2 and
accept these proposals. A similar argument is used when worker 1 deviates.
Theorem 151.1 in Osborne and Rubinstein (1995) implies that this strategy
pro…le is a SPE for ± close to one. Also, if an encompassing union form in
all periods, the discounted payo¤ sum to 1
1¡±¢(12) for both workers.
Thus, for any ¹ < 1, there is a SPE such that an encompassing union
forms in all time periods. Also, note that this pro…le is also a CPNE. This
follows since a strategy pro…le being a SPE implies that no single worker
has an ICI upon the strategy pro…le. Since the discounted payo¤ sum to
1
1¡±¢(12) for both workers which is the highest possible sum of discounted
payo¤s, both workers cannot gain strictly by a deviation. Also, consider any
33SPE such that an encompassing union not form in all periods. Then the
discounted payo¤ sum for both workers is strictly smaller than 1
1¡±¢(12).
Then, for ± close to one this pro…le cannot be a CPNE. This follows since,
by the folk theorem, there is a SPE strategy pro…le where an encompassing
union form in all time periods and gives a strictly higher discounted payo¤
for both workers.
4.2 Legislative Advantages for Unions
What happens if union bargaining power is stronger than when workers bar-
gaining separately ? Such a situation could occurbecause unions have certain
legislative advantages. This could be modeled in di¤erent ways. For exam-
ple, suppose the union has a better outside option when bargaining with the
…rm, compared to when workers stand alone. Let ¹ v denote the outside option
for the union, where ¹ v > ¹ u1 + ¹ u2. Then the total surplus for the union is
¹(1 + µ) + ¹ v
2
:
Assuming that di = wi(i) for i = 1;2. Then, by using the same argument
as in Corollary 1, an encompassing union forms if 1 +
¹ v¡(¹ u1+¹ u2)
(1+µ) ¸ ¹. Thus
a union forms for a larger set of values of ¹ if ¹ v increases. This is in line
with the …ndings of Freeman and Pelletier (1990), who studied the e¤ects of
changes in industrial relations legislation on union density in the UK. They
found that legislative amendments have an important e¤ect on union density.
345 Conclusions
We have studied the conditions under which similar workers join together
in an encompassing union. If workers are of the same type, then the set
of production functions leading to a CPNE with an encompassing union
contains the set of production functions which satisfy decreasing marginal
productivity.
In a bargain between a …rm and two workers, Horn and Wolinsky (1988)
showed that, if two workers are substitutes, they form a union, whereas if the
workers are complements, they bargain separately. In our model we obtained
the same result as Horn and Wolinsky with two workers, and were able to
show that the result does not necessarily extend to the case of more than
two workers. The intuition behind this result is that, if complementarity is
high, the workers have strong bargaining power when bargaining separately.
Thus, the workers get high wages. The …rm then incurs losses if it hires all
three workers and thus it chooses to hire less than three workers. This leads
to low payo¤s for all workers. By forming a union, the workers can reduce
their bargaining power and induce the …rm to hire all workers. This makes
it possible to capture the gain from the increasing returns in production.
E¤ects of changes in demand between skilled and unskilled labor and
in heterogeneity were also analyzed. If workers are unemployed if they do
not agree upon the wage di¤erential within the union, then if demand for
skilled labor increases, a smaller range of production functions gives rise
to an encompassing union (the production function needs to have ”enough”
decreasing marginal productivity). However, if the game in this case is played
repeatedly, an increase in demand for skilled labor does not (necessarily) lead
35to the breakup of unions. If workers get the stand alone wage if they do not
agree upon the wage di¤erential within the union, changes in heterogeneity
or demand for skilled labor do not a¤ect the formation of an encompassing
union. This is contrary to the result in the paper by Jun (1989). The reason
is that an increase in heterogeneity raises not only the stand alone wage for
the most productive worker but also the surplus to be shared.
We also examined the consequences of legislative amendments that a¤ect
the bargaining power of unions. Greater union bargaining power increases
the likelihood that an encompassing union forms.
36References
Bernheim, B.D., Peleg, B. and Whinston, M.D. (1987), “Coalition-Proof
Nash Equilibria : I. Concepts”, Journal of Economic Theory, 42, 1-12.
Blau, F.D. and Kahn, L.M. (1996), “International Di¤erences in Male
Wage Inequality : Institutions versus Market Forces”, Journal of Political
Economy, 104, 791-837.
Freeman, R.B. and Medo¤, J.L. (1984), “What do Unions do ?”, Basic
Books, New York.
Freeman, R.B. and Pelletier, J. (1990), “The Impact of Industrial Re-
lations Legislation on British Union Density”, British Journal of Industrial
Relations, 28, 141-164.
Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J. (1991), “Game Theory, MIT Press”, Cam-
bridge.
Gül, F. (1989), “Bargaining Foundations of the Shapley Value”, Econo-
metrica, 57, 81-95.
Hirsch, B.T. (1982), “The Interindustry Structure of Unionism, Earnings,
and Earnings Dispersion”, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 36, 22-39.
Horn, H. and Wolinsky, A. (1988), “Worker Substitutability and Patterns
of Unionization”, Economic Journal, 98, 484-97.
Jun, B.H. (1989), “Non-cooperative Bargaining and Union Formation”,
Review of Economic Studies, 56, 59-76.
Nickell, S. and Bell, B. (1995), “The Collapse in Demand for the Unskilled
and Unemployment Across the OECD”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy,
3711(1), 40-62.
Shin, H.-S. and Yi, S.-S. (1991), “Endogenous Formation of Coalitions,
Part 1: Theory”, mimeo, Harvard University.
Stole, L. and Zweibel, J. (1996), “Organizational Design and Technology
Choice under Intra…rm Bargaining”, American Economic Review, 86, 195-
222.
Westermark, A. (1998), “A Firm-Worker Bargaining Model”, Working
paper 1998:1, Uppsala University.
38